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nORbERT ROgOSZ
The Roman Republic and the Parthian Threat
of the Eastern Provinces in the Years 53—50 b.C.
One of M  licinius crassus’s most significant 
goals after obtaining the second consulate in the 
year 55 b c  was to strive for war achievements 
which could be compared to the recent successes 
of cn  Pompeius or with c  Iulius caesar’s fresh 
victories in gaul 1 Similarly as in the case of Pom-
peius and caesar, the method to achieve this goal 
was to grant a certain province with regency  there-
fore, as soon as Lex Trebonia was passed, which 
gave him a five-year-long reign over Syria as well 
as the right to start a large-scale military campaign2 
and organize the necessary army, even before the 
above-mentioned consulate expired, in November 
55 he led this army to the province he had been 
 1 Already the ancients paid attention to this fact  See in this context: Vell Pat  II, 46, 2; 
Plut , Crass  16, 1—3; App , B.C. II, 18, 65; Flor  I, 46, 2; 5; cass  dio Xl, 12, 1  cf  also: 
J  Wo l s k i:  “Rok 53 przed chrystusem  data przełomowa w dziejach imperializmu rzymskiego ” 
W: W 2500-lecie powstania Republiki Rzymskiej  Red   A  K u n i s z   Katowice 1995, pp  22—23 
 2 liv , per. cV; Vell  Pat  II, 46, 2; Plut , Crass  15, 5; Pomp  52,3; App , B.C. II, 18, 65; 
cass  dio XXXIX, 33, 2  On Lex Trebonia:  g  N i c c o l i n i:  I fasti dei tribuni della plebe  
Milano 1934, p  309;  g  R o t o n d i:  Leges publicae populi Romani  hildesheim 1962, p  408; 
as well as:  A E R  b o a k:  “the Extraordinary commands from 80 to 48 b c : A Study in 
the Origins of the Principate ” AHR, vol  24, 1918, pp  18—21;  A  g a r z e t t i:  “M  licinio 
crasso ” Athenaeum, vol  19, 1941, pp  27—28;  b A  M a r s h a l l:  Crassus. A Political Biog-
raphy  Amsterdam 1976, p  131;  A M  Wa r d:  Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic  
columbia—london 1977, pp  273—275;  N  R o g o s z:  Polityczna rola senatu w Republice 
Rzymskiej w latach 59—55  Katowice 2004, pp  299—302  cf  also:  A W  l i n t o t t:  Violence 
in the Republican Rome  Oxford 1968, pp  198, 214 
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granted 3 After arriving in Syria, he immediately restarted the preparations for 
the war against Parthians  thus, the beginning of his reign in this province 
resulted in significant changes in the Roman-Parthian relations 4
After getting an insight into the local relations and having the preparations 
finished, he crossed Euphrates straight away and, leading his army, invaded the 
Parthian area  however, in spite of the fact that crassus’s troops were acting 
on the Parthian area, the campaign of year 54 resulted neither in the laurels he 
expected, nor in conquests that would satisfy him 5 this is why, after returning 
to Syria, he initiated preparations for the next expedition, which he was going 
to carry out in year 53  yet, this expedition finished with the Roman defeat at 
carrhae on 9 June, 53, due to the fact that during the fights against Parthians 
crassus’s army was completely annihilated  the commander in chief and his 
son were killed and only few troops were saved from the rout 6
 3 More on the topic of crassus’s expedition to Syria: Vell  Pat  II, 46, 3; Plut , Crass  16, 
3—6; Pomp  52, 4; App , B.C. II, 18, 66; Flor  I, 46, 3; cass  dio XXXIX, 60, 4;  A d  S i m p -
s o n: “the departure of crassus for Parthia ” TAPhA, vol  69, 1938, pp  532—541;  b A  M a r -
s h a l l:  Crassus..., pp  139, 150;  A M  Wa r d:  Marcus Crassus..., pp  284—285 
 4 On the topic of crassus’s preparations for the war against the Parthians after assuming the 
reign of Syria: Plut , Crass  17, 2; cass  dio XXXIX, 60, 4; Xl, 12, 1  Since cn  Pompeius’s 
stay in the East, during the third war against Mithradates VI, the king of Pontus, the relations 
between Romans and the Parthians were appropriate or even friendly: liv , per  c; Plut , Pomp  
33, 6; 39, 2—3; App , Mithr  106, 501; Syr  51, 257—259; Flor  I, 46, 4—6; cass  dio XXXVI, 
45, 3; 51, 1; XXXVII, 5, 2—4; 6, 1—5; 7, 1—4; 15, 1;  J -P  R e y - c o q u i a s:  “Syrie Romaine, 
de Pompée à diocletien ” JRS, vol  68, 1978, pp  44—73;  A N  S h e r w i n - W h i t e:  “lucullus, 
Pompey and the East ” In: CAH, vol  9: “the last Age of the Roman Republic 146—43 b c ” 
Eds   J A  c r o o k,  A  l i n t o t t,  E  R a w s o n   cambridge 1994, pp  229—273;  R  S y m e: 
“Pompeius and the Parthians ” In: Anatolica. Studies in Strabo  Ed   A  b i r l e y   Oxford 1995, 
pp  87—94  cf  also:  A  K e a w e n e y:  “Roman treaties with Parthia circa 95—64 b c ” AJPh, 
vol  102, 1981, pp  195—212;  I d e m:  “the King and the War lords: Romano-Parthian Relations 
circa 64—53 b c ” AJPh, vol  103, 1982, pp  412—428;  J  Wo l s k i:  “Rzym i państwo Partów 
w I w  p n e ” KH, t  92, 1985, pp  221—233;  I d e m:  “Rzymska polityka na Wschodzie  Impe-
rializm rzymski w konflikcie z imperializmem irańskim ” W: Starożytny Rzym we współczesnych 
badaniach. Państwo — Społeczeństwo — Gospodarka  Red   J  Wo l s k i,  t  K o t u l a,  A  K u -
n i s z   Kraków 1994, pp  81—103 
 5 cf  in this light: Plut , Crass  17, 2—3; cass  dio Xl, 12, 2—13, 4; 16, 1—3 ; b A  M a r -
s h a l l:  Crasus..., pp  151—152;  J  Wo l s k i:  Imperium Arsacydów  Poznań 1996, pp  154—155  
 6 the source information and the literature which discuss crassus’s defeat at that time see: 
liv , per  cVI; Vell  Pat  II, 46, 4; Plut , Crass  17, 4—31; Pomp  53, 6; 55, 1; App , B.C. II, 
18, 66—67; Syr  51, 259; Flor , I, 46, 5—11; cas  dio Xl, 17, 3—27, 4; P  g r o e b e:  “der 
Schlachttag von Karrhae ” Hermes, vol  42, 1907, pp  315—322;  K  R e g l i n g:  “crassus’ Par-
therkrieg ” Klio, bd  7, 1907, pp  357—394;  F  S m i t h:  “die Schlacht bei carrhä ” HZ, bd  115, 
1915, pp  237—262;  d  t i m p e:  “die bedeutung der Schlacht von carrhae ” MH, bd  19, 1962, 
pp  104—129;  b A  M a r s h a l l:  Crassus..., pp  153—161;  M  M i e l c z a r e k:  “die parthische 
Panzerreiterei bei carrhae  Aus den Studien über Plutarchus, crassus XXIV — XXVII ” Fasciculi 
Archeologie Historicae, vol  4, 1990, pp  31—38;  J  Wo l s k i:  “Rok 53...,” pp  20—30;  I d e m: 
Imperium Arsacydów..., pp  155—160;  I d e m:  “czy rok 53 jest datą przełomową w historii 
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As a result of the above-mentioned military catastrophe, the eastern do-
minions of the Roman Republic: Syria and the neighbouring province of Asia 
Minor, first of all cilicia, were in great danger, similarly to the local city-states, 
rulers and peoples allied with Rome, since Rome was still in the state of war 
against Parthia started by the late crassus  As his army was defeated, besides 
minor forces stationing in the above enumerated provinces, the survivors saved 
from the rout committed by the Parthians and small contingents of their local 
allies that could enter on Roman request, there was no army that could effec-
tively defend the interests of the Republic and its allies 7 It also had to be taken 
into account that the Parthians would take advantage of the difficult situation 
their enemy was facing, they would cross Euphrates and attack Rome’s allies 
as well as the provinces which were unable to defend themselves effectively,8 
especially since some of the Parthian rulers had long exposed their striving for 
ruling the whole area that used to belong to the Achaemenid Persian Empire 
in their political programmes and propaganda 9
Materializing of these threats could cause the loss of at least some of the 
eastern provinces and allies as well as a change in the line-up of forces in Asia 
Minor, Syria and Palestine  Parthia was namely the only rival that could pose 
a threat to the position of the Roman Republic at that time 10 luckily for the 
Rzymu ” W: Przełomy w historii. XVI Powszechny Zjazd Historyków Polskich, Wrocław 15—18 
września 1999 roku. Pamiętnik, vol  2, part 1  Red   K  J u c h n i e w i c z,  J  t y s z k i e w i c z, 
W  W r z e s i ń s k i   toruń 2000, pp  9—15;  g c  S a m p s o n:  The Defeat of Rome. Crassus, 
Carrhae and the Invasion of the East  barnsley 2008, pp  114—181 
 7 c  cassius longinus, crassus’s quaestor, organised the necessary army, which amounted to 
two legions: cic , Phil  XI, 14, 35; Vell  Pat  II, 46, 4—5; Ioseph , Ant. Iud. XIV, 7, 3, 119; Bell. 
Iud. I, 8, 9, 180; cass  dio Xl, 28, 1—2  cf  also: Flor  I, 46, 10; Eutrop  VI, 18, 2; Oros  VI, 
13, 5  More about c  cassius longinus:  F r ö h l i c h:  “c  cassius longinus, der caesarmörder, 
59 ” In: RE, bd  3  Stuttgart 1899, col  1727—1736;  W  d r u m a n n,  P  g r o e b e:  Geschichte 
Roms in seinem Übergange von dem republikanischen zur monarchischen Verfassung  bd  2  
leipzig 1902, pp  98—128, on his activity related to the defence of Syria, see pp  100—101 
 8 cass dio Xl, 28, 3  the Romans took this possibility seriously into account  this is proven 
by the fact that in year 50 b c  they prepared the army for the expected war against Parthia: 
hirt , Bell. Gall. VIII, 54, 1; 55, 1; Plut , Caes  29, 3; Pomp  56, 3; App , B.C. II, 29, 114—115  
 9 this matter was emphasized by  J  Wo l s k i  in his studies  See:  I d e m:  “Program polity-
czny państwa partyjskiego ” Eos, vol  55, 1965, pp  152—159;  I d e m:  “les Achemenides et les 
Arsacides ” Syria, vol  43, 1966, pp  65—82;  I d e m:  Rzym a państwo Partów..., pp  222—223; 
I d e m:  Imperium Arsacydów..., pp  118, 142—147, more: 117—146  cf  also:  J  N e u s n e r: 
“Parthian Political Ideology ” Iranica antiqua, vol  3, 1963, pp  40—59 
 10 this thesis is well confirmed by the history of Roman-Parthian relations and especially by 
the defeat in the war against Parthia, which was provoked by crassus  the later arguments with 
them, e g  those carried on by M  Antonius, ended similarly  As a result, Augustus, the emperor, 
changed his policy towards Parthians  On the subject of the relations between Romans and Parthi-
ans and the position of the latter ones in the world in the 1st century b c , see: g  W i d e n -
g r e n:  “Iran, der große gegner Roms: Königsgewalt, Feudalismus, Militärwesen ” In: ANRW, 
t  II, hrsg   h  t e m p o r i n i,  W  h a a s e,  bd  9, 1  berlin—New hork 1976, pp  219—306; 
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Romans, Parthians did not attack the empire’s borders directly after the victory 
over crassus’s army at carrhae, since their ruler was too busy dealing with the 
leading aristocratic families, including Surena, the one crassus’s vanquisher 
came from  the domestic situation of the Parthian kingdom became stable only 
after he had been killed and the opposition debilitated 11 therefore, the Parthians 
invaded the areas belonging to or dependent on Rome only in year 52  It was 
repeated a year after that and in 50 another invasion was expected, but luckily 
for the Romans it did not happen 12
the scale of these Parthian expeditions was not large enough to result in 
conquering the eastern provinces  Moreover, they involved only some of the Ro-
man areas and the neighbouring countries  thus, they did not pose such a huge 
threat to the Republic and its local allies as it could have been expected just 
after crassus’s defeat, but the governing politicians did not know that yet  For 
that reason prevention of further course of events on the Parthian border which 
would be unfavourable for Rome was definitely a priority for them 
therefore, it is highly recommended to track and clarify the related actions 
of Roman authorities (especially the consuls, the senate, the popular assembly 
and the governors of eastern provinces) and the accompanying circumstances, 
as well as to trace the contemporary decisions of cn  Pompeius, who had great 
influence on their actions  the reason for this is that it may contribute to better 
cognition of these aspects of the history of Roman Republic, and especially the 
policy carried out in the East by the Romans at that time 
the most important sources on the basis of which the matters introduced in 
the title of this article can be presented, are texts which are either contemporary 
or only a little subsequent to the events considered herein  these texts include 
cicero’s correspondence from the years 53—50, which is of great significance, 
especially due to the fact that at that time for one year he was a governor of 
J  Wo l s k i:  “les Parthes et la Syrie ” Acta Iranica, vol  5, 1977, pp  395—417;  I d e m:  Rzym 
i państwo Partów..., pp  221—233;  I d e m:  Rzymska polityka..., pp  83—93;  I d e m:  Imperium 
Arsacydów..., pp  117—173  Parthians’ strong position in the world of that time, especially towards 
Rome, was denied in the previous studies  cf  e g : l  P i o t r o w i c z:  Dzieje rzymskie  Warszawa 
1934, pp  573—574;  K h  z i e g l e r:  Die Beziehungen zwischen Rom und dem Partherreich  
Wiesbaden 1964, pp  20 ff;  h  b e n g t s o n:  Römische Geschichte  München 1967, p 182 
 11 On the internal situation of Parthia, and especially on the conflict between Orodes II and 
aristocracy: Plut , Crass  33, 5 
 12 On the topic of the situation on the Roman-Parthian border in the years 52—50: liv , per  
cVIII; Vell  Pat  II, 46, 5; Ioseph., Ant. Iud  XIV, 7, 3, 119 ; 122; Bell. Iud  I, 8, 9, 180; 182; 
Plut , Brut  7, 2; 43, 5—6; cass, dio Xl, 28, 1—31, 1; Fest , Brev  VI, 18, 2; Oros  VI, 13, 5  
cf  also:  l  P i o t r o w i c z:  Dzieje rzymskie   , p  445;  N c  d e b e v o i s e:  A Political History 
of Partia  chicago—london 1969, pp  96—104;  K  S c h i p m a n n:  Grundzüge der parthischen 
Geschichte  darmstadt 1980, pp  40—41;  E  d ą b r o w a:  La politique de l’Etat Parthe à l’égard 
de Rome — d’Artaban II à Vologèse I (ca 11 — ca 79 de n.e.) et les facteurs qui le condition-
naient  Kraków 1983, pp  32—34;  M  J a c z y n o w s k a:  Dzieje Imperium Romanum  Warszawa 
1995, p  154  cassius dio (Xl, 31, 1) indicates that the battles against Parthians ended in 51 b c 
45the Roman Republic and the Parthian threat   
cilicia, one of the eastern provinces threatened by Parthia 13 the matters related 
to the studied subject do appear quite frequently in these letters, however they 
are presented neither constantly, nor in a complex and exhaustive way, because 
cicero and his correspondents only mentioned issues bothering them the most  
the information they include are of various origin: they mostly come from 
the authors of these letters, but they also derive from their allies’ reports and 
rumours 14 For this reason the value of the news varies  they do not only in-
troduce the matters of our interest from the point of view of the Roman rulers, 
but also from the point of view of different politicians who did not hold any 
public posts at that time and, moreover, were not Romans 15
In their later reports, c  Iulius caesar and A  hirtius mention some detailed 
issues only very briefly,16 similarly to the authors contemporary to the Empire,17 
who also dealt with the matters of our interest rather modestly and economically  
Although they were deeply interested in the matter of Roman-Parthian relations, 
they focused rather on more significant issues, such as crassus’s expedition and 
especially on its climax, which was the battle of carrhae 18
the issue examined by the author of the present article is similarly pre-
sented in subject literature  this is well visible e g  in the works of J  debecq, 
 13 cicero and his correspondents did mention this subject in the several dozen of their let-
ters from those years, however these notes are usually laconic  More on the topic of cicero’s 
correspondence, see:  J  c a r c o p i n o:  Cicero. The Secrets of his Correspondence  Vol  1—2, 
New york 1969;  K  K u m a n i e c k i:  Literatura rzymska. Okres cyceroński  Warszawa 1977, 
pp  384—399; M  tullius cicero was the governor of cilicia in the years 51—50:  W  F e e m s t e r 
J a s h e m s k i:  The Origins and History of the Proconsular and the Propraetorian Imperium to 
27 B.C. chicago 1950, p  148;  t R S  b r o u g h t o n:  The Magistrates of the Roman Republic  
Vol  2: 99 B.C. — 31 B.C  New york 1952, pp  243, 251—252  cf  also:  K  K u m a n i e c k i: 
“cyceron w cylicji ” Meander, t  13, 1958, pp  449—470;  I d e m:  Cyceron i jego współcześni  
Warszawa 1989, pp  357—386;  M  g e l z e r:  Cicero. Ein biographischer Versuch  Wiesbaden 
1969, pp  225—242;  E  d u l s k i:  “cyceron jako namiestnik cylicji ” W: Antiquitas, t  15  Red  
E  K o n i k.  Wrocław 1992, pp  23—39 
 14 this is quite frequently mentioned by cicero himself: Ad Att  V, 6, 1; 14, 1; 16, 4; Ad 
fam  XV, 3, 1; Ad Att  V, 18, 1; Ad fam  XV, 9, 2; 2, 1; III, 8, 10; VIII, 10, 1; II, 10, 2; XV, 4, 
5; 7; Ad Att  V, 21, 2; Ad fam  XIII, 57, 1 
 15 the great orator indicates this clearly in many cases: cic , Ad fam  XV, 3, 1; VIII, 10, 1; 
2, 3; Ad Att  V, 21, 2; VI, 1, 3; Ad fam  XV, 4, 7; XIII, 57, 1  he was also given some informa-
tion by the refugees who came from areas directly jeopardised by Parthian invasion: cic , Ad 
Att  V, 16, 4 
 16 See: Caes , bell  civ  I, 2, 3; 4, 4; 9, 4; 32, 4; hirt , Bell. Gall  VIII, 52, 3; 54, 1—3; 
55, 1 
 17 liv , per  cVIII; Vell  Pat  II, 46, 4—5; Ioseph , Ant. Iud  XIV, 7, 3, 119—122; Bell. Iud  
I, 8, 9, 180—182; Plut , Caes  29, 3—4; Pomp  56, 3; Brut  7, 2; 43, 5—6; App , B.C. II, 29, 
114—115; cass  dio Xl, 28, 1—31, 1; 65, 1—66, 1; Fest , Brev  VI, 18, 2; Oros  VI, 13, 5 
 18 liv , per  cVI; Vell  Pat  II, 46, 1—5; Ioseph , bell  Iud  I, 8, 9, 180; Ant  Iud  XIV, 7, 
3, 119; Plut , Crass  16—33; Pomp  55, 1; Brut  43, 5—6; App , B.C. II, 8, 65—67; Flor  I, 46; 
cass  dio Xl, 12—37; Fest , Brev  VI, 18, 2; Oros  VI, 13, 5 
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g  downey, J -P  Rey-coquias, A  Keaveney, E  dąbrowa, J  Wolski, P  Arnaud 
and t P  hillman, devoted to Roman-Parthian relations, in the studies of 
A N   erwin-White and A d  Sullivan, which deal with Roman foreign policy 
and the relations of Rome and the eastern countries,19 the papers of P  Stein and 
M  bonnefond-coudry that discuss the functioning and actions of the senate,20 
the study of W  Feemster Jashemski, treating of the history of provinces 
governing,21 in the works of the following authors: M  gelzer, F  Smokowski, 
K  Kumaniecki, M  grzesiowski, l A  thompson and E  dulski, which, among 
other matters, refer to M  tullius cicero’s activity on the post of the governor 
of cilicia,22 or F  Münzer, W  drumann and P  groebe, t R S  broughton, M J g  
grey-Fow and I  hofmann-löbl, concerning the activities of M  calpurnius 
bibulus, the administrator of Syria,23 as well as in the monographs of N c  
debevoise, M A R  colledge and J  Wolski, which discuss the history and role 
 19 J  d e b e c q:  “les Parthes et Rome ” Latomus, t  10, 1951, pp  459—469;  g  d o w n e y: 
“the Occupation of Syria by the Romans ” TAPhA, vol  82, 1951, pp  149—163;  J -P  R e y -
c o q u i a s:  “Syrie romaine, de Pompée à diocletien ” JRS, vol  68, 1978, pp  44—73; A  K e a v -
e n e y:  “the King and the War-lords   , vol  ciii, 1982, pp  412—428;  E   d ą b r o w a:  La 
politique..., Kraków 1983;  A N  S h e r w i n - W h i t e:  Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 168 
B.C. to A.D. 1  duckworth 1984;  R d  S u l l i v a n:  Near Eastern Royalty and Rome, 100—30 
B.C. toronto—buffalo—london 1990;  J  Wo l s k i:  “les Parthes et la Syrie ” AJ, vol  5, 1977, 
pp  395—417; I d e m:  Rzym i państwo Partów..., pp  221—233;  I d e m:  Rzymska polityka 
na Wschodzie..., pp  81—103;  I d e m:  “Wpływ imperializmu rzymskiego na losy wschodnich 
prowincji rzymskich ” W: Antiquitas, t  21, red   t  K o t u l a,  A  Ł a d o m i r s k i   Wrocław 
1995, pp  55—63; P  A r n a u d: “les guerres parthiques de gabinius et de crassus et la politique 
occidentale des Parthes Arsacides entre 70 et 53 av  J -c ” Electrum, vol  2: “Ancient Iran and 
the Mediterranean World,” red   E  d ą b r o w a.  Kraków 1998, pp  13—34  cf  also:  t P  h i l l -
m a n:  “Pompeius ad Parthos?” Klio, bd  78, 1996, pp  380—399 
 20 P  S t e i n:  Die Senatssitzungen der Ciceronischen Zeit (68—430)  Münster 1930; 
M  b o n n e f o n d - c o u d r y:  Le Sénat de la République romaine de la guerre d’Hannibal 
à Auguste  Rome 1989 
 21 W  F e e m s t e r  J a s h e m s k i:  The Origins and History   
 22 M  g e l z e r:  “M  tullius cicero der Redner, 29 ” In: RE, 2 Reihe, hlb  13, Stuttgart 
1939, col  827—1091;  F  S m o k o w s k i:  “cyceron w Azji ” Eos, vol  47, 1957, pp  111—125; 
K  K u m a  n i e c k i:  “cyceron w cylicji   ,” pp  449—470;  M  g r z e s i o w s k i:  “Wojskowa 
kampania cycerona w cylicji jesienią 51 roku ” Meander, t  15, 1960, pp  155—166;  I d e m: 
“Partowie zagrażają wschodnim prowincjom rzymskim wiosną i latem 50 r  p n e ” Meander, 
t  15, 1960, pp  288—295;  l A  t h o m p s o n:  “cicero’s succession — problem in cili-
cia ” AJPh, vol  86, 1965, pp  375—386;  E  d u l s k i:  “cyceron jako namiestnik cylicji   ,” 
pp  23—39 
 23 F  M ü n z e r:  “M  calpurnius bibulus, 28 ” In: RE, hlb  5, Stuttgart 1897, col  1368—
1370;  W  d r u m a n n,  P  g r o e b e:  Geschichte Roms..., bd  2, leipzig 1902, pp  80—86; 
t R S  b r o u g h t o n:  The Magistrates   , vol  2, pp  242, 250;  R  S y m e:  “M  bibulus and Four 
Sons ” HSCPh, vol  91, 1987, pp  185—198;  M J g  g r e y - F o w:  “the Mental breakdown of 
a Roman Senator: M  calpurnius bibulus ” GR, vol  37, 1990, pp  179—190;  I  h o f m a n n -
l ö b l:  Die Calpurnii  Frankfurt am Main 1996 
47the Roman Republic and the Parthian threat   
of the Parthians in the East 24 Some information related to the discussed matter 
can also be encountered in presentations of various aspects of the crisis of the 
Roman Republic25 and in the synthetic studies of the history of its last decades 26
It was impossible to prevent or even reduce the threat that Parthia was posing 
directly after crassus’s defeat at carrhae or in the following months, because 
the capital of the Republic had been long plunged in anarchy  government of-
fices in Rome did not function and the rule was in the hands of interreges, who 
were changed every five days  they were in office for a very short time and, 
what is more, were not competent enough, which prevented them from dealing 
with military issues and foreign policy 27
this was mainly caused by the exacerbating rivalry for high-ranking posts 
and corruption spreading during elections  As a result of revealing in year 54 
most probably the biggest corruption scandal in the history of the Roman Re-
public the consuls and, as a consequence, other magistratus curules elections 
for the following year did not take place 28
As well as this, the complicated situation in Rome in year 53 was also 
a result of an argument that took place in year 54 between the optimates and 
cn  Pompeius  Aiming at weakening the position of the only triumvir in Rome 
at that time, they initiated an array of campaigns against his closest cowork-
ers, which usually ended in lawsuits against them 29 Pompeius responded with 
preventing his enemies from efficient ruling by sustaining anarchy in the capital 
 24 N c  d e b e v o i s e:  A Political History of Parthia...;  M A R  c o l l e d g e:  The Parthi-
ans  london 1967;  J  Wo l s k i:  Imperium Arsacydów...
 25 See  e g :  E  M e y e r:  Caesars Monarchie und das Principat ds Pompejus  Stuttgart—
berlin 1922;  J  d i c k i n s o n:  Death of a Roman Republic. Politics and Political Thought at 
Rome 59—44 B.C  New york—london 1963 
 26 cf  e g :  t  R i c e  h o l m e s:  The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire, 
vol  2  Oxford 1923; CAH, vol  9 
 27 See  in this context: cic , Ad fam  VII, 11, 1; II, 4, 1; 5, 1—2; Plut , Caes  28  3—4; Pomp  
54, 2; App , B.C. II, 19, 68—71; cass  dio Xl, 17, 1—2; 45, 1—46, 1;  E  M e y e r:  Caesars 
Monarchie..., pp  207—214, cf  also 191—207;  t  R i c e  h o l m e s:  The Roman Republic..., 
vol  2, pp  152—159;  J  d i c k i n s o n:  Death of a Roman Republic..., pp  154—155 
 28 Plut , Pomp  54, 2; cat  Min  44; App , B.C. II, 19, 69—71; cass  dio Xl, 45, 1; 2—4; 
cf : Plut , caes  28, 3;  J  l i n d e r s k i:  Rzymskie zgromadzenie wyborcze od Sulli do Cezara  
Wrocław—Warszawa—Kraków 1966, pp  142—147;  g V  S u m n e r:  “the coitio of 54 b c , or 
Waiting for cesar ” HSCPh, vol  86, 1982, pp  133—139;  h  K o w a l s k i:  “Przemoc jako me-
toda walki wyborczej w okresie schyłku republiki (78—50 r  p n e ) ” AUMCS, Sect  F, 1983/1984, 
38—39, pp  87—88;  I d e m:  “Przekupstwa wyborcze w Rzymie w okresie schyłku republiki 
(78—50 p n e ) ” RL, t  29—30, 1987—1988, pp  15—16;  I d e m:  “Armia a wybory w Rzymie 
w okresie schyłku republiki ” In: Antiquitas, vol  14, red   A  Ł a d o m i r s k i   Wrocław 1988, 
p  123 
 29 cass  dio XXXIX, 60, 2—4; 61, 3—63, 5;  M  g e l z e r:  Pompeius  München 1949, 
pp  178—179;  R  S e a g e r:  Pompey. A Political Biography  berkeley—los Angeles 1979, 
pp  132—141;  M c  A l e x a n d e r:  Trials in the Late Roman Republic, 149 B.C. to 50 B.C. 
toronto—buffalo—london 1990, pp  137—149  
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and spreading rumours among its inhabitants about the necessity of introducing 
dictatorship to establish order 30
using his influence, Pompeius succeeded in maintaining anarchy in Rome 
until July, or even August 53 31 Only then, after being granted the supervision 
over the Republic as a proconsul, he helped the present interrex to conduct 
the election of officials for the last months of that year 32 yet, since the sen-
ate disagreed with his dictatorship, after the election he returned to his former 
practices  In effect, the newly elected consuls did not succeed in electing their 
successors or any other magistratus curules for the year 52, which, therefore, 
also begun with interregnum.33 What is more, due to the growing competition 
between t  Annius Milo and P  clodius, the anarchy in the capital was spread-
ing even more 34 Only after the assassination of clodius, committed by Milo’s 
squads at the end of the second decade of January, the senate, influenced by 
M  calpurnius bibulus and M  Porcius cato, decided to invest Pompeius with 
the special power, yet, as consul without colleague 35
 30 Plut , Caes  28, 4; Pomp  54, 2; Cat. Min  45, 4; App , B.C. II, 20, 72—73; cass  dio 
Xl, 45, 1—5;  J P  b o r l e:  Pompée et la dictature, 55—50 av  J -c , LEC, vol  20, 1952, 
pp  172—175 
 31 Plut , Pomp  54, 2—3; App , b c  II, 19, 71; cass  dio Xl, 45, 1   l  P i o t r o w i c z 
(Dzieje..., p  424) suggests that the elections of the consuls took place in July   h  K o w a l s k i 
presents this similarly: “Przemoc...,” pp  87—88  More on this topic, see:  J  l i n d e r s k i: 
Rzymskie zgromadzenie wyborcze   , pp  147—148  
 32 Plut , Pomp  54, 2—3; App , B.C. II, 19, 71; cass  dio Xl, 45, 5—46, 1;  J  l i n d e r s k i: 
Rzymskie zgromadzenie wyborcze   , pp  148;  h  K o w a l s k i:  “Przemoc   ,” pp  87—88 
 33 cic , Ad fam  V, 18, 1; III, 1, 1; Vell  Pat  II, 47, 3; Plut , Pomp  54, 3; Cat. Min  47, 1—2; 
App , B.C. II, 20, 72—73; cass dio Xl, 44, 2; 46, 1—3  cf  also: liv , per  cVII;  E  M e y e r: 
Caesars Monarchie   , pp  211—214;  t  R i c e  h o l m e s:  The Roman Republic   , pp  163—165; 
J P  b o r l e:  Pompée   , pp  175—176;  J  d i c k i n s o n:  Death   , p  155;  J  l i n d e r s k i: 
Rzymskie zgromadzenie wyborcze   , pp  148—150;  A  ya k o b s o n:  Elections and Election-
eering in Rome. A Study in the Political System of the Late Republic  Historia Einzelschriften, 
h  128, Stuttgart 1999, p  171 
 34 this happened, among other things, because t  Annius Milon intended to strive for the 
consulate and P  clodius — for the office of praetor  both of them had the support of certain 
circles among the inhabitants of the capital, which additionally contributed to the revival of the 
antagonism that had been setting them at variance for a few years: cic , Ad fam  II, 6, 3—5; 
liv , per  cVII; Vell  Pat  II, 47, 3; Plut , Pomp  54, 3; Cat. Min  47, 1—2; App , B.C. II, 20, 
74; cass  dio Xl, 47, 1—48, 1;  A  ya k o b s o n:  Elections   , pp  171—173 
 35 cic , Ad fam  VII, 2, 2—3; Vell  Pat  II, 47, 3—4; Suet , Iul  26, 1; Plut , Caes  28, 5; 
Pomp  54, 3—4; Cat. Min  47, 2—3; App , B.C. II, 21, 75—23, 84; cass  dio Xl, 48, 1—50, 
5; J  van O o t e g h e m:  Pompée le Grand, bâtisseur d’Empire  louvain—Namur—Paris, 1954, 
pp  438—444;  J  l e a c h:  Pompey the Great  london 1978, pp  155—157  On the subject of 
his choice:  J  l i n d e r s k i:  Rzymskie zgromadzenie wyborcze   , pp  150—152;  h  K o w a l s k i: 
“Przemoc   ,” pp  88—89;  A  ya k o b s o n:  Elections   , p  58  According to livius (per  cVII), 
Pompeius was then elected consul in absentia 
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After being pronounced consul, Pompeius started organizing the matters of 
the country straight away 36 Internal issues, and especially striving for the rein-
forcement of his position in the Republic, were his priorities, though  Although 
he did also deal with the threat posed by Parthians, so to speak, by the way, while 
he was taking care of other problems 37 however, this does not mean that he 
ignored the danger in the eastern dominions of Rome — on the contrary, it was 
of great importance for him to obviate the danger, since this would guarantee 
that he would remain influential in the East 38 the fact that Pompeius did not 
emphasize these matters in his moves in year 52 might have been related to his 
unwillingness to irritate the aristocrats of optimate orientation who dominated in 
the senate at that time and who had been his new allies since he was invested 
with the special power 39 this is indicated by the opposition he met in the senate 
when, after finishing the third war with Mithradates VI and coming back from 
Italia, he asked for approval of the orders he gave in the East 40
to protect Roman dominions and eastern areas from Parthians, it was nec-
essary to take care of a few problems  Syria, which bordered Parthia directly 
and was defended from the Parthian king designs by c  cassius longinus, the 
quaestor of the late M  licinius crassus,41 needed a new governor as soon as 
possible  Moreover, just like the nearby cilicia and other provinces of Asia 
Minor, it also needed reinforcements to repulse the expected Parthian attacks 
effectively together with the few local troops  Also the local allies of Rome 
 36 cic , Ad fam  V, 18, 2; VII, 2, 2—3; liv , per  cVII; Vell  Pat  II, 47, 3—4; 48, 1; Plut , 
Pomp  54, 5; 55, 4—7; Cat. Min  48; App , B.C. II, 23, 87—24, 92; 25, 95; cass  dio Xl, 50, 
5; 52—55 
 37 Vell  Pat  II, 47, 3—48, 1; Plut , Pomp  55, 1; 7; App , B.C. II, 24, 92—25, 95; cass  dio 
Xl, 51—56  cf  also: 57 as well as liv , per  cVII 
 38 he enjoyed this considerable influence in this area since the time he was at war with 
Mithradates VI, the king of Pontus, during and after which he established in this region new 
political order, which was convenient for himself as well  On the topic of Pompeius’s activity 
in the East and its results, see e g :  g  W i r t h:  “Pompeius im Osten ” Klio, bd  66, 1984, 
pp  574—580;  M  d r e h e r:  “Pompeius und die kaukasischen Völker: Kolcher, Iberer, Albaner ” 
Historia, bd  45, 1996, pp  188—207;  J  b e l l e m o r e:  “Josephus Pompey and the Jews ” His-
toria, bd  48, 1999, pp  94—118;  J  Wa g n e r:  Östlicher Mittelmeerraum und Mesopotamien. 
Die Neuordnung des Orientis von Pompeius bis Augustus (67 v. Chr. bis 14 n. Chr.)  Wiesbaden 
1983 
 39 cf  in this light: liv , per  cVII; Vell  Pat  II, 47, 3; Suet , Iul  26, 1; Plut , Caes  28, 5; 
Pomp  54, 3—5; 55, 1—3; Cat. Min  47, 2—3; App , B.C. II, 23, 84; 25, 95; cass  dio Xl, 50, 
4—5 
 40 See  on this topic: cic , Ad Att  I, 13, 4; 14, 1; Vell  Pat  II, 40, 5; Suet , Iul  19, 2; Plut , 
Pomp  46, 3; Cat. Min  31, 1; Luc  42, 5—6; App , B.C. II, 9, 31—32; cass  dio XXXVII, 49, 
2; 49, 4—50, 1;  J  M u r p h y:  “Pompey’s Eastern Acta ” AHB, vol  7, 1993, pp  136—142  cf  
also the literature quoted in footnote 38 
 41 lv , per  cVIII; Vell  Pat  II, 46, 5; cass  dio Xl, 28, 1—29, 3 
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required reinforcements in order to make them defy Parthia willingly or to 
prevent them from changing their orientation and join Parthian king 42
Of course, these demands could not have been fulfilled at once, due to 
the complicated situation in the capital in the year 52  Meeting those demands 
required time because of the huge distance separating Syria and Asia Minor 
from Italia, for instance  however, it should not have been deferred, despite 
the fact that from cn  Pompeius’s and his new allies’, who were dominating in 
the senate, point of view there were some more urgent problems in Rome to be 
dealt with 43 taking into consideration the immense significance of the eastern 
provinces for the empire, as well as his own interests, Pompeius started to take 
care of those issues as soon as it was possible 
the most important matter was to appoint a new governor of Syria and 
invest him with powers which would correspond to the dangers threatening 
this province at that time, so that he could replace c  cassius longinus  this 
was because until then the only move of Roman authorities as far as Syria was 
concerned was to accept the part that longinus had been playing in Syria since 
crassus’s defeat at carrhae 44 due to the complicated situation in Rome and 
lack of any possibilities in this aspect, no other action was taken  In the year 
52 appointing a governor of Syria was still a complex issue, since crassus was 
handed over control of Syria for five years on the basis of Lex Trebonia  It was 
thanks to this very law that Pompeius was entrusted with governing Spanish 
provinces for the same period of time and under the same conditions 45 crassus 
was already dead, but Lex Trebonia was still legally binding and Pompeius was 
 42 this anxiety was justified, which was proven by the attitude of the Armenian king: cic , 
Ad fam  XV, 3, 1  In order to prevent such moves of the local allies, the senate decided to take 
appropriate preventive steps  cf  pp  55—56 
 43 this point of view of these politicians proves well the justification of the motion with 
which M  calpurnius bibulus and M  Porcius cato suggested to entrust Pompeius with the post 
of consul without colleague: Plut , Caes  28, 5; Pomp  54, 3—4  cf  also: liv , per  cVII; Vell  
Pat  II, 47, 3; Suet , Iul  26, 1; Plut , Cat. Min  47, 2—3; App , B.C. II, 22, 79—23, 84; cass  
dio Xl, 50, 4—5 
 44 this is proven by cicero’s letter, in the headline of which he addresses c  cassius longi-
nus proquaestor: cic , Ad fam. XV, 14, prescript  cf  also:  W  F e e m s t e r  J a s h e m s k i:  The 
Origins   , p  156;  t R S  b r o u g h t o n:  The Magistrates   , vol  2, pp  237, 242;  I d e m:  vol  3: 
Supplement, Atlanta 1986, p  51  According to cassius dio (Xl, 28, 2), c  cassius was granted 
the command over the troops stationing in Syria by the soldiers and, directly after the battle of 
carrhae, before his death, also by crassus, however cassius did not accept it  Still, in the next 
months of the year 53 and in the following years he had Syria under his care  In this light the 
Roman authorities only accepted the state of affairs being 
 45 this is especially emphasized by cassius dio (XXXIX, 33, 2)  this matter is presented 
similarly also by other ancient authors who mention the second consulate of Pompeius and crassus 
as well as this law: liv , per  cV; Vell  Pat  II, 46, 2; 48, 1; Plut , Pomp  52, 3; cat  Min  43, 1; 
App , b c  II, 18, 65  On the subject of Lex Trebonia see literature quoted in footnote 2 
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still governing Spain 46 Moreover, the senate, which traditionally assigned new 
governors to different provinces, could not change or invalidate a law passed 
by the citizens by its own resolution  this law could be repealed only in one 
way: by a new resolution of popular assembly  Only Pompeius, who had huge 
power at that time and, thus, the adequate authority, could bring to it 47
taking all these points into account, the potent politician began to take 
care of the problem of Syrian administration in a rather extraordinary way  In 
order not to get entangled in contradictions of legal nature, he first introduced 
a new decision which prolonged his governing of the Spanish provinces for 
another term, starting with the year 52 48 It is not known whether the decision 
was introduced in the senate or within popular assembly, but in practice this 
meant canceling Lex Trebonia  In this way he removed legal obstacles which 
prevented Syria from having a new governor appointed  however, he did not 
regulate this question separately  he solved it at once by a new resolution of 
public assembly along with normalizing the method of appointing governors 
of the other provinces, because since the time of l  cornelius Sulla, who had 
determined this method of appointing them, the order he established became 
seriously disrupted 49 Aiming at eradicating corruption and eliminating violence 
 46 On the basis of this law Pompeius was to hold the post of the governor of the Spanish 
provinces until the year 50  See  in this light: Plut , Caes  28, 5; Pomp  52, 3; App , B.C. II, 18, 
65; cass  dio XXXIX, 33, 2 
 47 According to livius (per  cVII) and Velleius Paterculus (II, 47, 3—4) in the year 52 
Pompeius was officially pronounced to be in charge of the Republic and the one to deal with 
the bringing the chaos it was engulfed in under control  Sec : Suet , Iul  26, 1  A different view 
of this matter, see: Plut , Caes  28, 5; Pomp  54, 3—4; Cat. Min. 47, 1—3; App , b c  II, 23, 
84; cass  dio Xl, 50, 4—5 
 48 thanks to this, Pompeius secured his position  As a result, in the future, in case of a change 
in the situation in the country, or breaking the alliances, neither his enemies nor the senate could 
change his position easily  the ancient authors present this matter in an unclear and ambiguous 
way  According to cassius dio (Xl, 56, 2), Pompeius “took” the Spanish provinces for further 
five years  In Pompeius’s hagiography (55, 7), in this respect Plutarch alludes to a voting, however 
it is not known where — in a public assembly or in the senate  yet, in caesar’s biography (28, 
5) he mentions that the governing in these provinces was extended by the senate  Appian (b c  
II, 24, 92), however, claims that the senate passed giving him two additional legions and extend-
ing his governing, but this does not have to mean that it took the final decision in this matter  
It is possible that this was only a resolution approving of handing down this question for people 
debate  See  also:  M  g e l z e r:  Pompeius   , pp  191—192;  J  van O o t e g h e m:  Pompée   , 
p  460;  J  l e a c h:  Pompey   , pp  160—161;  R  S e a g e r:  Pompey   , p  150 
 49 the orders of l  cornelius Sulla concerning this matter included that each consul and 
praetor, after having handed in their office, would take over the running of a province for one 
year  however, sometimes some of the former officials, as e g  caesar, Pompeius, crassus and 
other influential Romans, were granted the governing of provinces not for one, but for several 
years  What is more, the two prior ones governed more than one province  Others, as e g  M  
tullius cicero, did not want to leave Rome and go to their provinces, so they did not take over 
the running of these provinces  the already mentioned crassus and Pompeius acted similarly 
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during competition for the highest offices,50 he also decided, in accordance with 
the senate’s previous year’s resolution, that from then on the politicians who 
were to assume the office of consul or praetor can only be given control over 
provinces after five years had passed from submitting the office 51 In order not 
to cause chaos in the nearest years while filling the posts with new governors, 
according to lex Pompeia de provinciis, which regulated these issues, it was 
agreed that first of all the posts would be given to the former consuls and prae-
tors who, after having submitted their posts, had not taken care of any province 
yet, because of different reasons 52
Since the problem of filling the posts of governors had been solved alto-
gether and in the same way for each of them, this meant also that Syria and 
the provinces of Asia Minor (Asia, bithynia and Pontus, cilicia) would not 
have new governors appointed straight away, but only after the previous gov-
ernors’ terms had passed, which was going to happen in the year 51 53 It was 
then when some decisions were made, according to the norms and decisions 
concerning this issues and included in the mentioned Pompeius’s law, but also 
in accordance with the senate’s resolution 54 Syria was entrusted to a former 
consul from the year 59, M  calpurnius bibulus, and cilicia was assigned also 
to a former consul, but from the year 63, M  tullius cicero  the control over 
Asia was given to Quintus Minucius thermus, a former praetor of the year 58, 
and over bithynia and Pontus — to P  Silius, the former praetor of year 57 55
after the first consulate held in the year 70  As a result of such practice the system of the staff-
ing introduced by Sulla collapsed, especially because since his times the number of provinces 
increased and did not correspond to the number of the posts of consuls and praetors, who were 
the officials entitled to administer them  On the topic of Sulla’s reforms concerning this subject, 
see:  J  M a c d o n a l d  c o b b a n:  Senate and Provinces, 78—49 B.C   , pp  72—82; cf  also 
82—87;  th  h a n t o s:  Die Verfassung des Dictators Sulla  Hermes Einzellschriften, h  50, 
Stuttgart 1988, pp  89—120 
 50 Vell  Pat  II, 47, 3  cf  also in this light: liv , per  cVII; Plut , Pomp  54, 2; 55, 4; Cat , 
Min  48, 2—4; App , B.C. II, 23, 87—24, 92; cass  dio Xl, 51—55 
 51 cassius dio paid attention to this fact (Xl, 46, 2; 56, 1);  h  K o w a l s k i:  “Przekupst-
wa   ,” p  16  Pompeius, however, did not obey this rule, since while he was the consul in the 
year 52, he extended his governing of Spanish provinces by five years 
 52 this was the consequence of previous rule (cass  dio Xl, 46, 2; 56, 1) 
 53 See:  W  F e e m s t e r  J a s h e m s k i:  The Origins   , pp  138, 148, 152, 155—156; 
t R S  b r o u g h t o n:  The Magistrates   , vol  2, pp  242—243 
 54 this is emphasized by cicero in the context of his governing in the letter to Appius clau-
dius Pulcher, the former administrator of cilicia: Ad fam  III, 2, 2  More on the topic of political 
and legal basis of the post held by the great orator in this province:  A J  M a r s h a l l:  “the lex 
Pompeia de provinciis (52 b c ) and cicero’s Imperium in 51—50 b c : constitutional Aspects ” 
In: ANRW, t  I, hrsg   h  t e m p o r i n i,  bd  1  berlin—New hork 1972, pp  887—921 
 55 On the subject of staffing these provinces with new administrators, see:  W  F e e m s t e r 
J a s h e m s k i:  The Origins   , pp  138, 148, 152, 155—156;  t R S  b r o u g h t o n:  The Mag-
istrates   , vol  2, pp  242—243, 250—252 
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Also the powers of these governors were adjusted to the current needs  this 
was of great importance especially in the case of bibulus and cicero, since it 
was their provinces which were the most threatened by Parthia 56 thanks to this, 
with Pompeius’s and the senate’s help, they could start increasing the number of 
soldiers stationing there and, after the seizure, defending these territories  having 
enough competence and such major support they were also able to carry out 
the, as it would seem at that time, attractive and effective policy with regard 
to their local allies 57
however, the new governors did not take up their missions enthusiastically, 
some of them treating them even as a necessary evil 58 their reluctance to the 
tasks they have been entrusted with, often against their will, might have been 
caused by the level of difficulty and danger they could expect after assuming 
their roles  that is why they made use of their presence in Rome, and even 
before leaving Italia they tried to gain the decision to increase immediately the 
number of troops stationing in their provinces 59 they tried to achieve this by 
the senate and by Pompeius, who had a lot of say, or even the final word, in 
public matters  both Pompeius and the majority of senators acknowledged and 
supported these aspirations,60 but one of the then consuls, Servius Sulpicius 
Rufus, prevented the senate from passing the resolution 61 It is not known what 
induced him to do so  It might have been the already growing feud between 
caesar and Pompeius, since Sulpicius supported the former one and he could 
have feared that the army gathered in Italia would eventually be used against 
the conqueror of gaul 62
 56 It is not known when exactly this happened  cicero wrote about the expected resolution 
of the senate concerning this issue in several letters just after leaving Rome: cic , Ad Att  V, 4, 
2; 5, 1; Ad fam  III, 3, 1 
 57 cf  in this light: cic , Ad Att  V, 4, 2; 5, 1; 6, 1; 7, 1; Ad fam  III, 3, 1—2; Ad Att  V, 14, 
1; Ad fam  XV, 3, 1—2 
 58 It was especially noticeable in M  tullius cicero’s attitude, who emphasized his reluctance 
to the mission of governing cilicia, which he was entrusted with against his own will, in numer-
ous letters  See  e g : cic , Ad fam  III, 2, 1; Ad Att  V, 11, 1; 15, 1  Also M  calpurnius bibulus 
was reluctant as far as assuming the duties of the administrator of Syria is concerned: cic , Ad 
Att  V, 16, 4; Ad fam  XV, 3, 2; Ad Att  V, 18, 1 
 59 On the subject of the efforts to achieve this, especially cicero’s, see: cic , Ad fam  III, 2, 
1; Ad Att  V, 4, 2; 5, 1; 7, 1; Ad fam  III, 3, 1—2  
 60 cic , Ad Att  V, 6, 1; 7, 1; Ad fam  III, 3, 1 
 61 Ibidem;  P  S t e i n:  Die Senatssitzungen   , pp  55—56  More about this politician, see: 
g  P i a n k o:  “Korespondenci cycerona  Serwiusz Sulpicjusz Rufus ” Meander, t  18, 1963, 
pp  16—25 
 62 Suet , Iul  29, 1; cass  dio Xl, 59, 1;  E  M e y e r:  Caesars Monarchie   , pp  245—246; 
N  R o g o s z:  “Senat a konflikt Pompejusza z cezarem  Wniosek konsula Marcellusa z 51 
roku p n e  w sprawie odwołania cezara z prowincji ” In: Antiquitas, t  13, Red   E  K o n i k  
Wrocław 1987, pp  214, 220—222;  I d e m:  “Funkcjonowanie senatu w Republice Rzymskiej 
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In this situation the senate forced the newly appointed governors to leave 
immediately in order to prevent further deterioration of the situation in the 
East 63 thus, they left the capital without his decision to increase the number of 
legions which were to repulse Parthians, but during their journey they continued 
to take care of this matter, as well as the problem of a sufficient number of 
commanders, the pay and the condition of their predecessors’ troops 64 Eventu-
ally, the awaited resolution was passed by the senate 65
the governors of the eastern provinces were allowed to carry out additional 
levy, however not within Italy, which they were particularly interested in due 
to the value of the local recruits, but within the area of Asia Minor 66 It is not 
surprising that they were not satisfied with this solution, for the indigenous 
inhabitants of Asia Minor were not highly valued soldier material 67 In this 
situation they had to decide to recruit the Roman citizens who stayed in the 
eastern provinces permanently or temporarily at that time 68 Still, this source of 
recruitment was not too big  Moreover, as cicero indicates, the Romans staying 
in the east, facing the perspective of participating in the war against Parthia, 
tried to avoid at any cost being conscripted into the legions formed there 69 
For this reason especially bibulus and the already mentioned cicero could not 
have counted on significant increase in the number of their troops  As a result, 
when they assumed the posts of the administrators of Syria and cilicia, they 
had rather sparse forces 70
w 51 r  p n e ” Res Historica, t  5: Graecorum et Romanorum memoria  Ed   l  M o r a w i e c k i  
lublin 1998, pp  138—140;  M  b o n n e f o n d - c o u d r y:  Le Sénat..., p  560 
 63 cic , Ad fam. III, 3, 1  thus, cicero left Rome on 1st May 51:  K  K u m a n i e c k i:  Cy-
ceron i jego współcześni   , p  357;  E  d u l s k i:  “cyceron jako namiestnik   ,” p  25;  I d e m: 
“Podróże Marka tulliusza cycerona do grecji ” In: Antiquitas, t  16  Ed   E  K o n i k   Wrocław 
1992, pp  8—9 
 64 cicero’s efforts concerning this issue are well substantiated: cic , Ad Att  V, 4, 2; 5, 1; 6, 
1; 7, 1; Ad fam  III, 3, 1—2; Ad Att  V, 14, 1; 15, 1; 17, 2;  M  b o n n e f o n d - c o u d r y:  Le 
Sénat   , p  211 
 65 It is not known when exactly eventually the senate made this decision  however, this 
fact is proven by the information included in cicero’s letter, in a form of a report, to the senate 
and the officials, in which the great orator reported on the results of his current achievements 
concerning the province he was entrusted with: cic , Ad fam  XV, 2, 4  See  also: cic , Ad Att  
V, 4, 2; 5, 1; Ad fam  III, 3, 1 
 66 Ibidem; cic , Ad Att  V, 18, 2 
 67 cic , Ad fam  XV, 1, 5  this is why cicero, despite everything, insisted on the senate to 
let supplement the army forces stationing in cilicia by the levy from Italy  (cic , Ad Att  V, 4, 
2; 5, 1; Ad fam  III, 3, 1)  this was also the reason for which he wanted App  claudius, who 
had governed this province in the preceding years, not to send his troops home and leave them 
in good condition (cic , Ad fam  III, 2, 1; 3, 2; Ad Att  V, 14, 1) 
 68 cic , Ad Att  V, 18, 2 
 69 cic , Ad fam  XV, 1, 6 
 70 cicero incessantly emphasized this in his letters addressed to various Roman politicians and 
the senate: cic , Ad Att  V, 15, 1; Ad fam  VIII, 15, 1; Ad Att  V, 18, 1—2; Ad fam  XV, 1, 4—5 
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therefore cicero, for instance, using various methods, attempted to increase 
the battle value of his rather modest army  Among other things, he looked after 
friendly atmosphere in the legions subordinate to him, he also made sure that 
the soldiers were well treated and took care of the fact that they did not com-
plain about anything 71 Similarly, he looked after the inhabitants of cilicia  he 
particularly cared for the fact that the soldiers’ attitude towards him and the 
Romans in general was as good as possible  he was namely perfectly aware 
of the fact that otherwise he could not count on them during the battles with 
the Parthians 72
the situation of the Romans could have also been influenced by the conduct 
of their local allies, which is why the senate recommended the governors of the 
eastern provinces appropriate attitude towards them  this can be suggested, since 
in one of his letters written to t  Pomponius Atticus cicero explained how he 
perceived his tasks regarding the allies of the Republic and the resulting priori-
ties  these included: lenient treatment, acting towards them with moderation, 
and keeping the pledges 73 these factors were to help retain their support, thanks 
to which the Romans wanted to keep their influence in the whole region  they 
also hoped that these allies would defy Parthians’ activity aimed at winning as 
many as possible rulers, peoples and cities, also at Roman expense  these aims 
could be proven by Armenian attitude, whose ruler married his sister off to the 
son of the Parthian king and became closely affiliated to him 74 the efforts of 
the Romans should not be a surprise, as there was going to be a longer war 
between these two superpowers, among other reasons  After crassus’s defeat 
at carrhae, when the Romans had little chances to succeed in a clash with 
Parthia, more and more eastern rulers started acting ambiguously and did not 
want to support the Romans actively 75 For this reason the Republic did not 
have many allies and it needed them badly  bearing this in mind, presumably 
in order to encourage the rest of the allies to persevere, the senate particularly 
 71 cic , Ad Att. V, 14, 2; 18, 2; Ad fam. XV, 2, 1  As it can be assumed, cicero’s subordi-
nates acted similarly due to appropriate orders of their governor, who, therefore, had reasons to 
be proud: cic , Ad Att  V, 17, 2 
 72 he especially cared about the fact that his subordinates and the officers would not commit 
malpractice (cic , Ad Att  V, 17, 2)  he also intended to devote a lot of attention to judicature 
(cic , Ad Att  V, 14, 2)  cf  also: cic , Ad fam  XV, 3, 2 
 73 Ibidem  See also in the same context: cic , Ad fam  XV, 2, 4; 7 
 74 cic , Ad fam  XV, 3, 1 
 75 cf  in this light: cic , Ad fam  XV, 3, 1; 1, 5—6  Only few of the local allies remained 
faithful to the Romans  dejotar was an exception notable for his loyalty and, thus, highly ap-
praised by cicero: cic , Ad Att  V, 18, 2; Ad fam  XV, 1, 6  their attitude, however, should not 
surprise anybody, due to the scantiness of the Roman army in that region, since everyone was 
expecting an outbreak of a huge war between the Romans and the Parthians: cic , Ad fam. XV, 
1, 4—5 
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recommended some eastern rulers, for example Ariobarzanes, to the governors 
of the local provinces 76
Nevertheless, when in summer of the year 51 c  cassius sent news to Rome 
that the Parthians had crossed Euphrates and invaded Syria, he was not given 
credence 77 Many senators doubted as to whether these news were true or accused 
cassius of exaggeration  they actually went as far as to assert that he sent them to 
hide his malpractice and especially the alleged plunders in Syria and that he would 
explain the ruin of this province by the robberies committed by the Parthians 78 the 
news in cassius’s letters were looked at differently only when they were confirmed 
by the letters of dejotar, who also sounded a warning about the danger that the 
Parthians were posing and informed about their invasion 79 this news resulted in 
the senate changing their stand, because until then it did not acknowledge the 
threat that Parthia was posing and procrastinated the prevention with appropriate 
decisions and moves 80 At last the Romans realized that the governors of Syria 
and cilicia would not be able to stop the Parthians, even with the support of other 
provinces of Asia Minor and the contingents provided by the allies  One of the 
reasons was that neither bibulus nor cicero were outstanding leaders and thought 
rather about how to prevent a general war than how to oppose the invaders 81 
For this reason the senate suggested to send an experienced leader to the East, 
who would deal with the problem of Parthian threat in favour of Rome  Some 
claimed that this person should be Pompeius 82 they were undoubtedly driven by 
the fact that he had numerous military achievements to his credit and, what is 
more, he knew those countries, because in the sixties, after l  licinius lucullus 
had been dismissed from the commander-in-chief post, Pompeius continued the 
war against Mithradates  After having won this war, Pompeius established order, 
which provided him with great influence and respect in this region 83 these as-
sets made Pompeius the most suitable candidate to lead the war against Parthia  
 76 cicero stressed it strongly in his extensive, report-like letter written to the senate: cic , 
Ad fam  XV, 2, 4; 7;  M  b o n n e f o n d - c o u d r y:  Le Sénat   , p  442 
 77 cic , Ad fam  VIII, 10, 1; 3  See also in this context: cic , Ad Att  V, 16, 4; Ad fam  VIII, 
15, 1; XV, 3, 1; Ad Att  V, 18, 1; Ad fam  XV, 9, 2; 2, 1; 1, 1—3; III, 8, 10  
 78 cic , Ad fam  VIII, 10, 3 
 79 cic , Ad fam  VIII, 10, 1; 3 
 80 On the topic of the former position of the senate towards the Parthian threat to the eastern 
provinces see: cic , Ad fam  VIII, 10, 2—3;  P  S t e i n:  Die Senatssitzungen   , pp  55—58  cf  
also:  R  K a m i e n i k:  “O senatus frequens i o absencjach cycerona w senacie ” In: Antiquitas, 
t  15, 1992  Ed   E  K o n i k   Wrocław 1992, p  94;  N  R o g o s z:  “Funkcjonowanie senatu   ,” 
pp  138—140, 149—151 
 81 See in this context: cic , Ad fam. VIII, 5, 1; Ad Att  V, 18, 1 
 82 the discussion on this matter was widely reflected in cicero’s correspondence: cic , Ad 
fam. VIII, 10, 2  cf  also: VIII, 5, 1; Ad Att. V, 18, 1 
 83 On the topic of the effects of gn  Pompeius’s activitiy in the East and the influence he 
enjoyed in that region and in Rome see: Vell  Pat  II, 40, 2; Plut , Pomp  46, 1; App , B.C. II, 1, 
2; cass  dio XXXVII, 20, 1—5  See also: liv , per  c — cII; Vell  Pat  II, 37; 40; Plut , Pomp  
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Still, some other senators claimed that caesar would be a better candidate for this 
mission 84 they backed this up with his successes in gaul and particularly dealing 
with the gaulish uprising the year before  yet, other senators suggested that they 
should entrust the consuls of the year 51 with this task,85 however the latter ones 
feared it, so they obstructed the senate’s session on this issue  As a result, there 
were no concrete decisions, due to the consuls’ dilatory acting and the fact that 
they simply did not care about solving this problem, really 86
In this situation, the governors of the eastern provinces assumed a similar 
attitude, especially cicero and bibulus, whose actions were indecisive  they 
cared more about the formal fulfilment of their duties than about real engage-
ment into the fights against the Parthians 87 therefore, when summer of the 
year 51 ended and the Parthians withdrew from Antioch, the contentment of 
both the governors reached its peak 88 Many Roman politicians, however, were 
aware of the fact that this was not the end of the war  they expected that in 
the year 50 for many months the contemporary consuls, the senate and first 
of all the administrators of Syria and the adjoining cilicia would have to deal 
with the Parthians again 89
their fears were justified, since the Parthians did not leave the Roman area 
in the year 51 and their troops were still staying on the right bank of Euphra-
tes 90 despite this, c  cassius, who was successfully repulsing their attacks on 
Antioch, considered the combats with the Parthians finished 91 however, cicero, 
who ruled cilicia, was of different opinion, just like king dejotar  they claimed 
that the Parthians decided to winter on the occupied area, as they waited for the 
arrival of their king, together with the whole army,92 which was said to happen 
33—34; 38—39; 45; Flor  I, 40, 27—31; cass  dio XXXVI, 53; XXXVII, 2, 6—7; 5—6; 14, 
3—16, 4, as well as the literature quoted in footnote 38 and 40 
 84 cic , Ad fam. VIII, 10, 2 
 85 Ibidem 
 86 Ibidem, 10, 2—3;  P  S t e i n:  Die Senatssitzungen   , pp  55—58;  R  K a m i e n i k: 
“O senatus frequens   ,” p  94;  N  R o g o s z:  “Funkcjonowanie senatu   ,” p  150 
 87 In the case of cicero the indication of such attitude were for instance his constant efforts 
to return to Rome as soon as possible  therefore, the great orator would not miss any opportunity 
to ask the politicians staying in the capital neither to extend his governing nor to increase his 
scope of duties (cic , Ad Att  V, 11, 1; 15, 1; 17, 2; 18, 1; Ad fam  XV, 9, 2; II, 7, 4)  bibulus, 
however, tried to reach Syria, which he had been assigned to, as late as possible  As a result, he 
got there when the combats with the Parthians had ended, i e  when they had withdrawn from the 
besieged Antioch (cic , Ad. Att  V, 16, 4; Ad fam  XV, 3, 2; Ad Att  V, 18, 1; Ad fam  II, 10, 2) 
 88 Especially cicero expressed his great satisfaction because of this: cic , Ad fam  III, 8, 10; 
II, 10, 2; 4 
 89 cic , Ad fam  VIII, 10, 3; II, 10, 4  
 90 cic , Ad fam  VIII, 6, 4; 7, 1; Ad Att  V, 21, 2  cf  also in this light: Ad fam  II, 10, 2; 
XV, 4, 7 
 91 cic , Ad Att  V, 21, 2  See also: Ad fam  II, 10, 2; XV, 4, 7 
 92 A more thorough disquisition of cicero, related to this matter see:: cic , Ad Att  V, 21, 2 
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in the spring of the following year  the Roman politicians also thought so and, 
thus, seriously took into account another attack of the powerful Parthian forces 93
As a result, the idea to send Pompeius along with additional legions to the 
East in order to defy the invaders effectively was becoming more and more 
popular 94 Particularly the governors of the most endangered provinces counted 
on this and, as the rumours about Pompeius’s arrival were spreading, they 
begun to feel more and more secure 95 however, on the other hand, they were 
afraid that the senate would be indecisive, while they were of the opinion that 
it should take a binding decision in this matter rather quickly  Meanwhile, the 
news coming from Italy did not include any information about the awaited 
resolution,96 so cicero supposed that presumably it was caused by c  cassius’s 
overoptimistic reports  yet, he hoped that bibulus’s tremulous letters, which 
were written a little bit later, would stir the senate from its lethargy and cause 
a change in the senators’ attitude concerning this issue 97 Finally, the hopes and 
calculations of cicero were confirmed by Pompeius himself, when he informed 
that he will be commissioned the command of further struggles with the Parthi-
ans 98 this message was of immense significance, because the information got 
from different sources confirmed that when the right moment came, there would 
be a great war in Syria 99
Presumably, influenced by such news in the spring of the year 50 in Rome, 
a constructive decision was taken to send two legions to Syria  Pompeius and 
caesar were to separate legions from the composition of their armies, one each 100 
 93 cicero included the news on which such speculations were based in the letter written to 
his close friend, t  Pomponius Atticus, which was referred to in the preceding footnote 
 94 Information on this subject see: cic , Ad Att  VI, 1, 3  
 95 these rumours had been intensifying for a few months, due to the fact that the idea of 
entrusting Pompeius with the leadership in the expected war against Parthia appeared quite early 
among the senators  See in this context: cic , Ad fam  VIII, 5, 1; Ad Att  V, 18, 1; Ad fam  VIII, 
10, 2; Ad Att  V, 21, 3; VI, 1, 3; 14 
 96 cf  in this light: cic , Ad Att  V, 21, 3; VI, 1, 14 
 97 the great orator assessed negatively c  cassius longinus’s reports sent to Rome, which 
discussed the results of the fights with the Parthians in Syria in the year 51  First of all, he thought 
that the proquaestor presented them in a light which was overoptimistic and too favourable for 
the Romans, which meant also himself  cf : cic , Ad Att  V, 21, 2; VI, 1, 14 
 98 cic , Ad Att  VI, 1, 14;  M  g e l z e r:  Pompeius..., pp  203, 205—206;  R  S e a g e r: 
Pompey..., p  154 
 99 the news confirming this reached the Roman politicians, and especially the governors of 
eastern provinces, as for example M  tullius cicero, from various sources and for a longer period 
of time  About this issue see: cic , Ad fam  II, 10, 4; XV, 4, 5; VIII, 7, 1; Ad Att  V, 21, 2; VI, 
1, 3; 14; Ad fam  XIII, 57, 1; Ad Att  VI, 2, 6; 3, 2; 4, 1; 5, 3;  M  g r z e s i o w s k i:  “Partowie 
zagrażają   ,” pp  288—295  their inflow only ceased in July 50: cic , Ad fam  II, 17, 1; Ad Att  
VII, 1, 2  See also the literature quoted in footnote 12 
 100 cic , Ad fam  II, 17, 5; VIII, 14, 4; hirt , Bell. Gall  VIII, 52, 3; 54, 1; caes , Bell. civ  
I, 32, 6; App , B.C. II, 29, 114; cass  dio Xl, 65, 2; 66, 1;  P  S t e i n:  Die Senatssitzungen   , 
p  59; N  R o g o s z:  “geneza wojny domowej lat 49—48 p n e  a jej ujęcie w relacji Aulusa 
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this meant serious reinforcement of the forces in the East, since these were not 
supposed to be newly formed troops, but forces experienced in battles and with 
numerous victorious military campaigns on their scorecard 101 cn  Pompeius, 
wanting to retain his army not depleted and to weaken caesar at the same time, 
decided to enter a legion which he had lent to caesar before  As a result, caesar 
had to separate two legions from the composition of his army  In spite of this, 
suitably to the senate’s resolution and Pompeius’s demand, he sent one legion of 
his to the war against Parthia and he returned the other one to Pompeius 102 thus, 
soon both of them arrived from gaul to Italy and started the preparations to go 
to the East, from which there were still alarming news coming 103
Another important matter was to appoint new governors for the eastern 
provinces, because the current administrators were entrusted with these posts 
only for one year 104 however, the senate procrastinated 105 It is possible that 
hircjusza ” W: Historia i Współczesność, t  6: Z zagadnień historiografii od czasów antyku do 
XVI wieku  Red   A  K u n i s z.  Katowice 1982, pp  22, 24—25;  I d e m:  “Stanowisko senatu 
wobec konfliktu Pompejusza z cezarem (1 marca — 1 grudnia 50 r  p n e ) ” AUMCS, Sect  F, 
1994, vol  49, p  58 
 101 this opinion is justified and correct, since caesar and Pompeius had had their armies 
at their disposal for many years  What is more, their soldiers continuously took part in military 
action, however the legionist of Pompeius on a smaller scale  thus, they can be acknowledged 
as old comrades, experienced in war and knowing their trade inside out  Eventually both legions 
were separated from caesar’s army, as a result of Pompeius’s demands (this question is discussed 
more thoroughly hereinunder)  For this reason their military value was all the bigger, because 
these soldiers had participated in many difficult military campaigns organized by caesar during 
his invasion of gaul  On the topic of the fights with the gaulish tribes and with the germans, 
as well as their scale see: caes , Bell. Gall  I—VII; hirt , Bell. Gall  VIII, 1—49; Suet , Iul  25; 
Plut , Caes  15; 18—27; App , B.C. II, 17, 61; Flor  I, 45; cass  dio XXXVIII, 31—50; XXXIX, 
1—5; 40—53; Xl, 1—11; 31—44;  M  g e l z e r:  Caesar. Der Politiker und Staatsmann  Wies-
baden 1960, pp  92—179;  J  c a r c o p i n o:  Jules César  Paris 1968, pp  223—253, 281—285, 
300—333 
 102 hirt , Bell. Gall  VIII, 52, 3; 54, 1—3; caes , Bell. civ  I, 2, 3; 3, 2; 4, 4; 9, 4; 32, 6; 
Plut , Caes  29, 2; Pomp  56, 3; App , B.C. II, 29, 115; cass  dio Xl, 65, 3;  N  R o g o s z: 
“geneza   ,” pp  24—25;  I d e m:  “Stanowisko senatu    (1 marca — 1 grudnia 50 r  p n e )   ,” p  58 
 103 hirt , Bell. Gall  VIII, 54, 3; caes , Bell. civ  I, 2, 3; 3, 2; Plut , caes  29, 3—4; App , 
B.C. II, 29, 115; cass  dio Xl, 65, 3—4;  N  R o g o s z:  “geneza   ,” p  25 
 104 With reference to his governing, cicero mentioned one year term on this post very often, 
but in various contexts  (Ad Att. V, 15, 1; Ad fam. XV, 2, 1; 4, 2; Ad Att. VI, 2, 6; 3, 1; 5, 3; VII, 
3, 1  cf  also: cic , Ad Att. V, 11, 1; 17, 5; 18, 1; 3; Ad fam. XV, 9, 2; II, 7, 4; Ad Att. V, 21, 
2; VI, 1, 14; Ad fam. II, 17, 1; 15, 5)  the same time of office concerned also other governors 
of the province, because they all were assigned the posts on the same principles  See the text on 
p  52 and the footnotes 54—55 
 105 the fact that the senate delayed making a decision on this issue caused great discontent, 
complaints and grumbling of cicero, who ruled cilicia at that time: cic , Ad Att. V, 21, 3; VI, 1, 
14; 3, 1; Ad fam. II, 17, 1  cf  also: Ad fam. II, 15, 4  Similarly, probably the other administrators 
of the eastern provinces were also dissatisfied with the senate’s work and attitude, in particular 
M  calpurnius bibulus, who administered Syria, endangered by the Parthians  caesar informs 
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for the time of the expected fights the senate planned to bring these provinces 
under Pompeius’s control  If this was really the case, there was no need to deal 
with this matter, the more that the new administrators, and their ambitions, 
could complicate the situation in the east by hindering Pompeius to lead the 
war against Parthians  Still, since everybody wanted to leave this region as soon 
as possible, particularly before the expected outbreak of fights,106 the senate’s 
ambiguous policy, and especially lack of decision on this matter bred anxiety, 
fear and various speculations among the governors of the eastern provinces, 
whose terms were expiring 
the not very uplifting attitude of those governors caused anarchy in their 
provinces, which was intensifying with time 107 Moreover, bibulus, who was 
ruling Syria, was plunged into pain and mourning after his two sons had been 
murdered in Alexandria, so he did not quite care about the situation in his 
province 108 cicero, on the other hand, pondered over the approaching end of 
his mission in cilicia and his departure for Rome  therefore, he devoted a lot 
of time to the choice of a person who could temporarily be entrusted with the 
activities related to the governing of the province after he would had left 109 
Of course, he also dealt with the expected combats with the Parthians, but this 
was rather a formality for him, as he spent less and less time on the prepara-
tions for the war 110
In July 50 the situation suddenly changed due to the fact that the Parthians 
unexpectedly withdrew behind Euphrates,111 so the threat of the war was not 
real anymore  the Roman authorities already before this situation could not 
decide to pass the resolution ordering to send the two mentioned legions to the 
east, so afterwards it was almost certain that these legions would never reach 
these provinces 112 What is more, the Roman politicians in the capital stopped 
about the appointing of their successors in January 49 and the circumstances which accompanied 
this event : Bell. civ  I, 6, 5 
 106 On the subject of the attitude of the then governors of the eastern provinces, and par-
ticularly cicero’s, before the expected Parthian attack, see: cic , Ad fam. XV, 4, 5; VIII, 6, 4; 7, 
1; Ad Att. V, 21, 2—3; VI, 1, 14; Ad fam. XIII, 57, 1; Ad Att, VI, 2, 6; 3, 1—2; 4, 1; 5, 3; Ad 
fam  II, 17, 1; Ad Att  VI, 6, 3 
 107 cicero mentions this with discontent: Ad Att  VI, 4, 1; 5, 3 
 108 cic , Ad Att  VI, 5, 3; caes , Bell. civ  III, 110, 6; Val  Max  IV, 1, 15  More on this subject 
see:  W  d r u m a n n,  P  g r o e b e:  Geschichte Roms   , vol  2, p  87;  R  S y m e:  M. Bibulus   , 
p  190;  M J g  g r e y - F o w:  The Mental Breakdown   , 179;  I  h o f m a n n - l ö b l: Die Calpur-
nii   , p  192 
 109 cic , Ad Att  VI, 2, 6; 3, 1—2; 4, 1; Ad fam  II, 17, 1; 15, 4; Ad Att, VI, 6, 3  cf  also: 
VII, 3, 5 
 110 cic , Ad Att  VI, 1, 3; 3, 2; 4, 1; Ad fam  II, 17, 1; 3 
 111 Many ancient authors inform about this: cic , Ad fam  II, 17, 1; 3; 5; Ad Att  VI, 6, 3; 8, 
5; VII, 1, 2; cass  dio Xl, 29, 3  cf  also source texts and the literature quoted in footnote 12 
 112 cic , Ad fam  II, 17, 5; hirt , Bell. Gall  VIII, 55, 1; caes , Bell civ  I, 2, 3; 4, 4; 9, 4; 
App , b c  II, 29, 115; cass  dio Xl, 66, 1;  N  R o g o s z:  “geneza   ,” pp  25—26;  I d e m: 
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occupying themselves with the Parthians, as their attention was drawn to other 
problems, among others the matter of rewarding the governors who participated 
in the combats with the Parthians in the past years and assessing them as far as 
the effects of the actions they were conducting at that time were concerned 113 
however, all these matters were overshadowed by Pompeius’s and caesar’s 
conflict and the civil war, which was, thus, approaching rapidly 114
As it results from this discussion, the Roman authorities, in particular the 
consuls, and other senate’s members as well as cn  Pompeius, who was the 
dominating figure in Rome at that time, did not counteract the Parthian threat in 
the years 53—50 in a way that the Republic’s interests would require, in spite 
of the fact that they did appreciate the importance of the eastern provinces  the 
administrators of these provinces, especially of Syria and cilicia, had similar 
attitude  this surprising passivity of the Roman authorities and politicians was 
certainly not caused by their lack of interest in the fate of the eastern provinces, 
but by various complications of internal nature, which the then policy-makers 
considered much more important than the threats in the east  the later fate of 
the Republic order and maintaining the power by the elite that was governing the 
Republic at that time depended on the way these complications would be solved 
however, it must be noticed that the Roman politicians terribly neglected 
public issues at that time  they cared about their own interests, benefits, careers 
and accolades in the first place, and the matters of the country were a side issue  
At times they treated the duties they had been entrusted with as the necessary 
evil and they acted differently only when they could draw suitable profits from 
them 
In spite of all this, in the years 53—50 the Roman dominions in the east and 
their local allies were not brought under the control of the powerful neighbour, 
the Parthian kingdom  yet, this was rather the effect of a happy coincidence 
than of the Roman preventive actions  this coincidence was caused by the com-
plicated internal situation in the Parthian kingdom, which resulted in the lack 
“Stanowisko senatu wobec rywalizacji Pompejusz z cezarem (1 XII 50 r —11 I 49 r  p n e ) ” 
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o triumf i ich niepowodzenie ” W: Antiquitas, t  14  Red   A  Ł a d o m i r s k i,  Wrocław 1988, 
pp  89—95;  E  d u l s k i:  “cyceron   ,” pp  32—34 
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nia 50 r  p n e )   ,” pp  58—68;  I d e m:  “debata senatu z 1 grudnia 50 r  przed narodzeniem 
chrystusa w świetle konfliktu Pompejusza z cezarem ” Wieki stare i nowe, t  2  Red   I  P a n i c, 
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of freedom in the foreign policy carried out by its ruler  Since he only could 
attack the Romans and their local allies with a part of his forces, he could not 
have taken control over the areas he was interested in and gain the dominating 
position in that region for Parthia 
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REPublIKA RzyMSKA A zAgROżENIE WSchOdNIch PROWINcJI PRzEz PARtóW 
W lAtAch 53—50 PRzEd chR 
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Klęska M  licyniusza Krassusa pod carrhae w 53 r  przed chr  doprowadziła do wytworzenia 
się na wschodnim pograniczu Imperium Romanum bardzo niebezpiecznej dla Rzymian sytuacji, 
gdyż nie posiadali oni już w tym rejonie sił potrafiących przeciwstawić się zwycięskim Partom 
i obronić leżących tam prowincji  Ponieważ rzymskie państwo nadal znajdowało się z nimi 
w stanie wojny, należało się spodziewać, że ich władca zechce wykorzystać trudne położenie 
już pokonanych przeciwników, zaatakuje owe posiadłości i włączy je do własnego królestwa 
Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest prześledzenie polityki rzymskich władz wobec zagro-
żenia, które dla wschodnich prowincji stanowili Partowie, oraz jego podłoża  W początkowych 
partiach tekstu omawiana jest sytuacja wytworzona na Wschodzie po klęsce Krassusa oraz jej 
konsekwencje  Następnie analizowane są poczynania Rzymian wobec partyjskiego zagrożenia 
w latach 53—50  dążąc do ich dogłębnego wyjaśnienia, autor rozważa także sytuację panującą 
w Rzymie w latach 53—52, akcentując ówczesne konflikty polityczne znacząco ograniczające 
zdolności Republiki do zajmowania się sprawami Wschodu  Szczególną uwagę poświęcono rów-
nież wiążącym się z nimi działaniom gn  Pompejusza w czasie jego trzeciego konsulatu, a także 
wyznaczeniu wschodnim prowincjom nowych namiestników, zwłaszcza Syrii i cylicji najbardziej 
zagrożonym przez Partów oraz polityce konsulów i senatu wobec tej sprawy w latach 51—50 
Autor prezentuje także postawy zarządców wspomnianych prowincji, ich plany i zamierze-
nia, działalność w czasie pobytu na Wschodzie, szczególnie inicjatywy zmierzające do obrony 
powierzonych im obszarów przed atakami Partów, w tym dążenia do wzmocnienia stacjonujących 
tam wojsk  Ponadto współpracę owych namiestników, ich poczucie obowiązku oraz sposoby 
postrzegania i wypełniania przez nich powierzonych im zadań  Większość tych ostatnich kwestii 
przedstawiona jest w odniesieniu do cylicji, ponieważ o poczynaniach jej ówczesnego zarządcy 
M  tulliusza cycerona zachowało się najwięcej informacji, które na dodatek wywodzą się z jego 
tekstów 
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lA RéPublIQuE ROMAINE Et lA MENAcE dES PROVINcES ORIENtAlES 
PAR lES PARthES dANS lES ANNéES 53—50 AV  J -c 
R é s u m é
la défaite de M  licinius crassus à la bataille de carrhae en 53 av  J -c  a mené à la créa-
tion sur la frontière est d’Imperium Romanum une situation très dangereuse pour les Romains, 
parce qu’ils n’avaient pas dans cette région une armée capable d’affronter des Parthes victorieux 
et défendre ces provinces  Puisque l’Empire romain se trouvait en état de guerre avec eux, on 
pouvait attendre que leur souverain veuille bénéficier de la position difficile des adversaires déjà 
vaincus, et attaquerait ces territoires pour les joindre à son royaume 
l’objectif de cet article est d’analyser la politique des autorités romaines envers la menace 
que, pour les provinces occidentales, représentaient les Parthes, et de son origine  dans la première 
partie du texte, l’auteur présente la situation créée à l’Orient après la défaite de crassus, ainsi que 
ses conséquences  Ensuite il analyse les actes des Romains envers la menace des Parthes dans les 
années 53—50  Pour les expliquer de manière la plus minutieuse, l’auteur esquisse également la 
situation à Rome dans les années 53—52, en accentuant des conflits politiques contemporains, 
limitant considérablement les capacités de la République de s’occuper des affaires de l’Orient  
une attention particulière est portée sur les démarches de Pompée le grand pendant son troisième 
consulat, et sur la désignation des préfets nouveaux dans des provinces occidentales, surtout en 
Syrie et en cilicie, les plus menacées par les Parthes, ainsi que sur la politique des consuls et du 
Sénat, concernant cette affaire dans les années 51—50  l’auteur présente les attitudes des consuls 
mentionnés, leurs projets et plans, leur activité pendant le séjour à l’Orient, surtout des initiatives 
de défense des provinces contre les attaques des Parthes, y compris des plans de renforcer l’armée 
y stationnant  Il esquisse également la coopération de ces gouverneurs, leur sens du devoir et les 
manières de percevoir et d’exercer des tâches qui leur étaient confiées  la plupart de ces ques-
tions sont présentées par rapport à la cilicie, car la majorité d’informations préservées concerne 
le proconsul Marcus tullius cicero, en plus provenant de ses propres écrits 
